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DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
stead of a weapon. Here it is difficult to insist that the exclusionary rule
be applied. 2 Nevertheless, it is important that evidence other than
weapons be excluded when discovered in this situation because "there may
be strong incentive for [the police officer] to fabricate grounds for a
frisk since evidence leading to a conviction may be obtained thereby. As a
result, the reliability of the officer's testimony in these cases should be
subject to considerable doubt.""
Police misuse of searches incident to arrests-after Rabinowitg v.
United States4 allowed the police great latitude in making such searches-
became so great that it overshadowed the valid reasons for allowing
warrantless incident searches and led to the limitations enunciated in
Chimel.55 It seems clear that unless the scope of the frisk is limited then
the police will also misuse the frisk procedure. Restricting potential mis-
use by requiring the exclusion of all evidence, other than weapons, dis-
covered during a frisk should have the salutary effect of maximizing
individual freedom from official intrusion without sacrificing the effec-
tiveness of the frisk as a protective device.
J. DAVID JAMES
Criminal Procedure-The Potential Defendant's Right to a
Speedy Trial
In recent years the long quiescent sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial has undergone re-analysis by various federal and state courts.' The
Supreme Court of North Carolina in a recent decision, State v. Johnson,'
"The police find the exclusionary rule particularly repulsive in these circum-
stances. As Professor Skolnick has pointed out, "the impact of the exclusionary
rule, as the police view it, has not been to guarantee greater protection of the
freedom of 'decent citizens' from unreasonable police zeal, but rather to compli-
cate unnecessarily the task of detecting and apprehending criminals." J. Skolnick,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 227 (1966). Rather than alter his actions in response
to the rule, the policeman often attempts "to infuse the character of legality-
perhaps after the fact-into his actions." Id. 227.
' Comment, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
158, 170 (1966). "While there are serious objections to barring evidence of crime
discovered in a lawful search, the admissibility of evidence such as betting slips
or narcotics found during a stop may encourage the misuse of the search power."
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, supra note 50, at 186.
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
5Note, 78 YALE L.J., supra note 14, at 435-36.
'See gewrally U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Note, Justice Overdue-Speedy Trial
for the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REv. 95 (1952); Note, The Right to a
Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476 (1968).2275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274, rev'g 3 N.C. App. 420, 165 S.E.2d 27 (1969).
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revolutionized what had been the accepted constitutional criminal pro-
cedure in the state regarding the right to a speedy trial. North Caro-
lina has moved from a position that was mildly castigated by the United
States Supreme Court in Klopfer v. North Carolina3 to one more far
reaching than anything said in Klopfer. The North Carolina court has
shifted from a position holding that a defendant has no general right to
be tried at all' to the present stance suggesting that a defendant has a
right to be arrested.
In Johnson the defendant alleged that his right to a speedy trial had
been violated when he was not formally indicted and tried until four
years after the alleged armed robbery had occurred. Seven days after
the occurrence, the sheriff of Nash County went with a sworn warrant
to a neighboring county jail where Johnson was being held on other
robbery charges. Although he read the Nash County warrant to Johnson,
the sheriff did not formally serve it because he felt that he did not have
any jurisdiction outside his own county.' On that same day Johnson
confessed to the Nash County robbery; about one month later he en-
tered pleas of guilty to four other charges of armed robbery that had
occurred in Edgecombe and Wilson Counties and received four con-
current sentences. Johnson remained in the North Carolina state prison
without any action being taken in connection with the Nash County rob-
bery until almost four years later when an indictment was returned and
a detainer filed against him for this offense. At the then ensuing trial,
the defendant moved that the case be dismissed because of the violation
of his right to a speedy trial.
The North Carolina court, construing the right to speedy trial con-
tained in the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution,( re-
'386 U.S. 213 (1967).
' State v. Klopfer, 266 N.C. 349, 350, 145 S.E.2d 909, 910 (1966), rev'd, 386
U.S. 213 (1967).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-42 (1965) would seem to indicate that the sheriff could
have served the warrant:
When a felony is committed in any county in this State, and upon the com-
mission of the felony, the person or persons charged therewith flees or flee
the county, the sheriff of the county in which the crime was committed,
and/or his bonded deputy or deputies, either with or without process, is
hereby given authority to pursue the person or persons so charged, whether
in sight or not, and apprehend and arrest him or them anywhere in the
State.
See also N.C. GEN. STAT § 15-22 (1965).
'In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial was made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
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versed the conviction. It held that when there has been an atypical delay,
deliberately and unnecessarily caused by the prosecution, and when the
length of the delay has created a reasonable possibility of prejudice, the
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial.' The court spe-
cifically held that the same consideration must be given the potential
defendant as the formally accused whose trial has been unduly post-
poned.' In order to apply this right to a potential defendant, the court
treated the problem of the unserved warrant as if there had been no war-
rant at all.
Courts have universally held that every "accused" has a right to a
speedy trial.9 This right applies to those persons in jail,'" those out on
bond," those incarcerated in the state's prison for another offense,"2
and those serving a prison sentence imposed by another jurisdiction.3
However, most courts have refused to apply the right to a speedy trial
to the pre-indictment stage. They have held instead that the right at-
taches only when a formal complaint is lodged against the defendant
4
or when prosecution is begun.' Most courts also have held that delay
before the commencement of prosecution is controlled exclusively by the
applicable statute of limitations,' 6 but North Carolina is one of a few
275 N.C. at 277, 167 S.E.2d at 283.Id. at 272, 167 S.E.2d at 279.
*E.g., Jacobson v. Winter, 91 Idaho 11, 14, 415 P.2d 297, 300 (1966) ; State
v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 51, 145 S.E.2d 309, 313 (1965); see U.S. CONST. amend.
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
... trial .... ").
1" Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd sub. num. United States
v. Provoo, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam).
"1 Hicks v. People, 148 Colo. 26, 364 P.2d 877 (1961); People v. Den Uyl,
320 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1948).
" People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955). See Note, Con-
victs-The Right to a Speedy Trial and The New Detainer Statutes, 18 RUTGERS
L. REv. 828 (1964).
1" Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
"' Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1959); Iva
Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 350 (9th Cir. 1951);
People v. Aguirre, 181 Cal. App. 2d 577, -, 5 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960); State v. Le Vien, 44 N.J. 323, 328, 209 A.2d 97, 100 (1965); State v.
Jestes, - Wash. 2d -. -, 448 P.2d 917, 920 (1968). But see Lucas v. United
States, 363 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 1966) (right normally attaches when complaint
filed but in cases of special circumstances may attach earlier).
" Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 1962); Foley v. United
States. 290 F.2d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 1961); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 296 F. Supp.
591. 594 (M.D. Fla. 1969) ; State v. Burrell, 102 Ariz. 136, 137, 426 P.2d 633, 634
(1967): State v. Caffey, 438 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Mo. 1969). Generally in these
cases tihe courts considered the prosecution begun when the indictment was filed.
1 United States v. Fanczko, 367 F.2d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 1966); Nickens v.
United States, 323 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Harlow v. United States, 301
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states 17 that has no statute of limitations for securing an indictment on a
felony charge.
Johnson has gone much further than Klopfer by advancing the right
to a speedy trial to a point even prior to the grand jury indictment.
Klopfer dealt with the "cloud of an unliquidated criminal charge";18
Johnson considered delay before there was any formal charge at all. The
United States Supreme Court in Klopfer required the states to apply fed-
eral standards to the right of a speedy trial, but the North Carolina
Supreme Court has joined a few other jurisdictions" in adhering to a
new and enlarged sixth amendment standard. The North Carolina court
extended the federal framework of right to speedy trial, which in the past
was only applicable to the formally accused, to encompass also the po-
tential defendant.
A majority of courts have adhered to the demand doctrine,2" which
requires that the right to a speedy trial is waived if the defendant does not
demand trial. Courts have rationalized this doctrine by labeling speedy
trial "a personal right which may be waived by action inconsistent with
assertion of that right.' 2 ' Klopfer in no way disturbed the law as to the
requirement of demand. But the court in Johnson reasoned that the de-
mand doctrine is inapplicable to the potential defendant ;22 since he has no
formal knowledge of the pending charge, a court cannot realistically re-
quire him to demand a speedy trial.
The right to speedy trial has been said to serve three purposes:
This guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and op-
pressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern
F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 1962). But see Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 215
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 203 (D. Md. 1955).
17 South Carolina and Wyoming have no statute of limitations. Kentucky,
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia and West Virginia have no limitation
for bringing indictments for felonies. See N.C. GE-,. STAT. § 15-1 (1965) for a
statute of limitations on misdemeanors.
"S Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 227 (1967) (concurring opinion).
" People v. Hryciuk, 36 Ill. 2d. 500, 224 N.E.2d 250 (1967) ; Bell v. Mississippi,
- Miss. -, 220 So. 2d 287 (1969) ; cases cited notes 35, 37, 38 & 39 infra; see
Wilson v. United States, 335 F.2d 982, 984 (1963) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); cf.
Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), aff'd sub. norn. United States v.
Provoo, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam); Rost v. Municipal Ct., 184 Cal. App.
2d 507, 7 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1960).
2-E.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1958); United
States v. McIntyre, 271 F. Supp. 991, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Hollars,
266 N.C. 45, 52, 145 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1965). But see People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y.
353, 358, 130 N.E.2d 891, 895 (1955).
"1 Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1602
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Lagging Right to Speedy Trial].
22 275 N.C. at 272, 167 S.E.2d at 280.
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accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long
delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.23
The first two have no relevance to the situation of the potential defen-
dant. -owever, the third purpose is pertinent: The potential defendant
is even more susceptible to the hazards of a long-delayed trial than is one
formally accused. The latter is aware that prosecution is impending
and will seek out witnesses in his behalf; on the other hand, the potential
defendant "who is oblivious to the fact that the police have focused
suspicion upon him . . . has no reason to marshall his evidence or even
fix in his mind the events of the time in question. '2-
One f actor often considered 25 in determining if a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial is whether he has been prejudiced by
the delay. There are two basic types of prejudice that can result from
a denial of speedy trial-prejudice to the ability of the defendant to
receive a fair trial and prejudice to the defendant in such ancillary post-
trial matters as sentencing 2' and parole. In Johnson the court focused on-
prejudice in these post-trial matters. A defendant, like Johnson, who is-
already serving a sentence for another offense faces a great likelihood of
prejudice in ancillary matters if his trial is delayed. In its opinion the
North Carolina court disclosed a strong probability of prejudice as far
as sentencing is concerned:
Had this case been tried during the fall of 1963 the record suggests
(1) that defendant would have plead guilty in Nash just as he had done
in Edgecombe, and Wilson, and (2) that Judge Fountain, who had
imposed concurrent sentences for the ... [other] crimes . . . would
have permitted the Nash County sentence to run concurrently with
the others.27
In a recent decision, Lawrence v. Blackwell,2s a federal district court
also recognized the problem of ancillary prejudice likely to result from
the state's delaying indictment on other charges when the defendant is
already serving a sentence. Smnith v. Hooey2" was interpreted by that
'^"United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
' Lagging Right to Speedy Trial 1613.
-'State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 542, 139 S.E.2d 870, 875 (1965).
" In North Carolina a sentence imposed runs concurrently as a matter of law
with other sentences already in force unless the sentencing judge orders to the
contrary. State v. Efrid, 271 N.C. 73i, 157 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1967) (per curiam).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-6.2 (1965).
" 275 N.C. at 275. 167 S.E.2d at 282.
'298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
" 393 U.S. 374 (1969). The Supreme Court extended the right to speedy
1969]
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court as requiring that no additional restrictions be imposed upon a
prisoner who has had a detainer filed against him if the state filing the
detainer has not made a diligent, good faith effort to bring him to trial
within a reasonable time after the filing.30 The court recognized that
prisoners with detainers filed against them suffer more restrictions than
their fellow inmates: The detainers have the effect of limiting their
eligibility for parole,31 of causing them to live in more restricted quar-
ters, and often of preventing them from taking part in a work release
program.
Because the court in Johnson found prejudice to the defendant in
sentencing and parole rights, it was unnecessary for it to reach and
discuss prejudice in the trial of the case itself-such as the inability of a
defendant to reconstruct an alibi.32 In recent years other courts that have
applied the right to speedy trial to the potential defendant 3 have had
to wrestle with this problem. Quite likely North Carolina courts in the
future will face it when they are presented with speedy trial cases that,
unlike Johnson, do not disclose post-trial prejudice.
The issue of prejudice at the trial stage involves a dual problem: the
quantum of prejudice that must be shown and the placement of the burden
of proof. Although several courts have dealt with the problem, "[i]t is
quite clear that no uniform test has yet been devised which has gained
universal acceptance."3 One view is that an accused, claiming that he
was denied a speedy trial when he was a potential defendant, must show
trial to encompass those persons already serving a prison sentence in another
jurisdiction. The Court was unclear as to the remedy that must be provided such
a defendant.
"o Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708, 714 (N.D. Ga. 1969). If the state
were required to attempt to secure the prisoner for speedy trial in its jurisdiction
as soon as it had probable cause to arrest and it had discovered his whereabouts,
much of this ancillary prejudice could be eliminated. Certainly if a defendant is
incarcerated in the same jurisdiction as the one seeking to try him, the state would
have no difficulty in providing the defendant with a speedy trial.
" It was pointed out in Johnson that the defendant was prejudiced with regard
to his parole rights by the filing of the detainer against him. 275 N.C. at 274,
167 S.E.2d at 281.
2 Johnson's counsel raised the possibility of this type of prejudice toward his
client at both the superior court trial and at the appellate level, but the supreme
court did not discuss the issue. Record at 22-23, State v. Johnson, 3 N.C. App.
420 (1969); Brief for Appellant at 6-7, State v. Johnson, 3 N.C. App. 420 (1969).
" Most of the cases dealing with the potential defendant have been narcotics
cases where undercover agents had operated in an area for several months and
then indicted at one time all of those persons from whom they had made illicit pur-
chases. See cases cited notes 35, 37, 38 & 39 infra.
", State v. Rountree, 106 N.J. Super. 135, -, 254 A.2d 337, 344 (Middlesex
County Ct. 1969).
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actual prejudice."5 Courts holding the defendant to a showing of actual
prejudice are in reality saying that the right to speedy trial rarely at-
taches to the potential defendant; it is almost impossible for a defendant
to prove actual prejudice if he cannot remember his activities on the date
of the offense. Although the North Carolina court did not have to reach
this issue, it indicated that a showing of actual prejudice probably would
not be required. 6
In Ross v. United States3 7 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the defendant's inability to reconstruct his where-
abouts on the date of the alleged offense was sufficient to show prejudice
and that the prosecution's inability to show good cause for delaying the
indictment must result in a determination that the defendant's right to a
speedy trial was denied. Thus a showing of the possibility of prejudice
was adequate; the burden was placed on the defendant to prove possible
prejudice, but on the state to show that the delay was necessary.38
In State v. RountreeN9 a New Jersey county court reached what
seems to be the most workable and desirable solution to the problem of
prejudice and the burden of proof. The court recognized that a purposeful
delay, caused by the use of undercover agents in the detection of narcotics
offenses, must be accepted to some extent in the interest of effective prose-
cution. The court found that only when the delay reaches such proportions
that the ability to conduct a defense is materially affected is there pre-
sumptively a violation of the guarantee of the right to a speedy trial.40
The initial burden, therefore, should be on the accused to demonstrate
a plausible claim of inability to remember the events of the day of the
offense and to show that he has consequently been prejudiced. This
burden should be one of a "preponderance of the probabilities, that is,
something beyond a mere assertion of an inability to recall or recon-
struct."
41
.United States v. Curry, 278 F. Supp. 508, 513 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
"State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 276-77, 167 S.E.2d 274, 283 (1969).
349 F.2d 210, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
But in a decision following Ross, Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705,
708 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court stated that the burden of proof was on the de-
fendant to establish both that there was no legitimate reason for the delay and that
he was prejudiced by it.
" 106 N.J. Super. 135, 254 A.2d 337 (Middlesex County Ct. 1969).
,o Id. at -, 254 A.2d at 345.
' Id. When a defendant cannot remember his whereabouts on the date of the
offense, the court should take into account the length of delay in determining
whether a showing of inability to reconstruct the events demonstrates a probability
of prejudice.
19691
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Although this quantum of proof is greater than the reasonable pos-
sibility of prejudice referred to in Ross v. United States,42 it nonetheless
seems warranted. Otherwise all that would be necessary for a defendant
to establish a prima facie showing of prejudice would be merely to assert
that he did not remember where he was or what he was doing on the
date of the alleged offense. But if the accused should make a showing of
prejudice by a preponderance of the probabilities, under Rountree the bur-
den of proof shifts to the prosecution to show that the pre-arrest delay was
necessary.43 This procedure seems wiser than leaving the burden on the
defendant to show that the delay was unnecessary. It is the state that has
caused the delay; therefore, the state should be in a better position to
show why it delayed.
A further analysis of the approach in Rountree seems to indicate that,
as an alternative to proving necessary delay, the state should be allowed
to rebut the defendant's showing of prejudice. For instance, most nar-
cotics cases involve the uncorroborated testimony of the undercover agent
that he has made a "buy," and it would be virtually impossible for the
prosecution to rebut the showing of prejudice although it might win its
case on establishing necessary delay. In Johnson, an armed robbery case,
the state's evidence consisted of a confession and an eye-witness identifi-
cation. Such evidence alone, absent a showing of ancillary post-trial
prejudice, should be sufficient to try the defendant over his assertion
that he was prejudiced , because he could not remember his whereabouts
on the date of the offense.
The most intrigping question raised by applying the right to speedy
trial to -the potential defendant is determining at what precise point
this right attaches. The court i. Johnson provided no clear answer. The
defendant was- apprehended almost immediately after the crime was com-
mitted; he confessed and implicated another person in the armed robbery.
The state claimed that it did not indict Johnson immediately because it
was looking for the odier person' and felt that Johnson would not testify
against his accomplice if he himself had already 'been tried, and sentenced
,42 349 F.2d 210 (D.C.. Cir, 1965).
.. State v. Rountree, 106 N.J. Super. 135,,-,, 254 A.2d 337, 345 (Middlesex
County Ct. 1969). The court in Johnson also recognized that certain reasonable
delays on the part. of theprosecution were justified, but it never made clear what
would be reasonable. Delay caused by the state's identifying or locating a co-
defendant hopefully -would be sufficient; to constitute a reasonable delay, In' nar-
cotics cases evidence of a reasonable delay, might consist of a showing up until the
time, of.the indictment the, undercover agent was making initial "buys" from new
sellers or was making contacts with suppliers.
[Vol. 48
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for the offense. Over four years later the state gave up its effort to ap-
prehend the accomplice and proceeded to indict Johnson. At some point
in this sequence of events the right to speedy trial attached.
If the right to speedy trial attaches at the moment the prosecution
acquires probable cause to arrest, the state would be required to make
public the fact of its investigation, perhaps a still ongoing one, by taking
the defendant into custody and warning him of his rights. In many cases
the prosecution's chances of gathering sufficient evidence to convince a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt would be lessened.
The state's ability to protect society from criminals would be greatly
burdened. Such a concept of the right to speedy trial runs contrary to
the generally accepted latitude allowed the police by the courts regarding
the time when they must press charges. "Law enforcement officers have
a right to wait in the hope that they may strengthen their case by ferret-
ing out further evidence or discovering and identifying confederates and
collaborators."44
The court in Johnson recognized these problems and pointed out' that
the state could delay "to protect and promote further responsible, police
investigation"45 and indict when the "case against a suspect, is-complete
and the testimony to convict him is at hand."4  This statement would
seem to indicate that even if the right to speedy trial -attaches at the,
moment of acquiring probable cause, the state would, be 'justified in a
delay based on the need for further investigation., ,However, the' court
raised further problems when it set forth this guideline for-'reaisonable de-'
lay by the prosecution. Such a rule necessarily requires : 'g reat deal of
hindsight. It is impossible for the prosecution t6 dterfi'ine the preciie
moment at which it has enough evidence t6'convict. 'A 'determinatioh of
guilt is left up to the members of the jury, and it is- never- lear just what
evidence will convince them beyond a reasonable doubt of'thle defendant's
guilt. In addition, how will the prosecutiont ever determine that -its
case is complete, that it has all the evidenceit will'eve obtain, or that it
will be unable to find the evidence it'had been hoping to find ?' In, the
future' the prosecution will have t6 balanice the desiiabil y of postp0ing
formal charges in order further to investigate 1against the possibility that
"Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841, 846 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,, 366 U.S.
944 (1961).
"275 N.C. at 273; 167 S.E.2d at 280. . . ... i
' Id. , . , ' '
'In Johnson the court found, that a four-year delay while attempting to 'findaI
collaborator was, unreasonable. Id. - ' ," , 1 o.. ' ,,
1969]
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such delay might later be declared unreasonable and thus void the prose-
cution's efforts altogether.
The court also stated that the state has the "duty . . . to file formal
charges when their case against a suspect is complete."4 This duty is
tantamount to a duty to arrest. If the state has this duty, then it would
seem to follow that the defendant has the correlated right to be arrested.
This constitutional doctrine is one that the United States Supreme Court
itself has declined to adopt.49
If the right to a speedy trial and the right to be arrested attach at the
point of the prosecution's acquiring probable cause, all that the defendant
needs to show is prejudice to his defense resulting from the state's delay
in arrest. If he can make such a showing and the state is unable to show
necessity for the delay, then the defendant is entitled to the remedy of
dismissal of his case.5" This remedy has normally been reserved only
for those who have been denied a speedy trial after they have been in-
dicted.
Having both the right to a speedy trial and the right to be arrested
attach at the moment of probable cause creates a new problematic situa-
tion. This new possibility is the specter of an evidentiary exclusionary
rule for the enforcement of sixth amendment rights,5 ' something never
fashioned or declared by any court in this country. Such a possibility
would occur, for example, in a case where the state delayed arrest for
six months after it had acquired probable cause, and at the trial the de-
fendant could not show that this delay prejudiced his own defense on the
merits but could show that the interval between probable cause and actual
arrest was a "fruitful" period for the state in the gathering of evidence.
If in fact the defendant's rights had been violated because he was not
48 275 N.C. at 273, 167 S.E.2d at 280.
"' Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Nothing ... in any ... case that has come to our attention, even remotely
suggests this novel and paradoxical constitutional doctrine, and we decline
to adopt it now. There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police
are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they
have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth
Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if
they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty
to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum
evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall
short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction.
Id. at 310.
"o State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 277, 167 S.E.2d 274, 283 (1969).
1 The exclusionary rule has been applied to the states in cases involving fourth
and fifth amendment rights. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal search
and seizure); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confession).
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arrested earlier, why would he not be entitled to have excluded from use
against him any evidence acquired by the state during the delay? Taken
to its logical conclusion, such a new interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment leads to an illogical result because the right to a speedy trial as a
shield for the defendant's protection will have become a sword for his
escape.5
2
By extending the right to a speedy trial to the period before indict-
ment, the North Carolina court has opened "a Pandora's box of nice
distinctions" :53 problems of proof, the precise point at which the right
attaches, and the possibility of an exclusionary rule. But at least North
Carolina has faced the problem of the potential defendant's right to a
speedy trial. Other courts have availed themselves of the protective .cloak
provided by statutes of limitations 4 to avoid resolution of this problem.
Such a cloak will have to be shed in the future, for a statute of limitations
merely puts a maximum limit on the time for indictment; only the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial can put the minimum limit on it.
North Carolina, in this area among the legal pioneers, has taken its first,
and therefore the most difficult, step in recognizing that a potential de-
fendant has, just as a defendant already under indictment, a basic right to
a speedy trial.
JOAN G. BRANNON
Domestic Relations-Evidence-Testimony by One Spouse against the
Other of Adultery Excluded under North Carolina Law
At common law neither husband nor wife was a competent witness
in any action to which the other spouse was a party.' Except in crim-
inal cases, this rule of disqualification has been largely overturned by
statute or by judicial decision in American jurisdiction's.2 In North Caro-
12 State v. Patton, 260 N.C. 359, 364, 132 S.E.2d 891, 894 (1969); Note, The
Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 853 (1957).
" Lagging Right to Speedy Trial 1617.
" See generally Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Pene-
trable Barrier to Prosecution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1954).
" C. M CORMIICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK]; D. STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 58 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANSBURY].
'Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against The Other in Criminal
Cases Where The Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications:
Modern Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359-60 (1952). Both husband and wife are fully
competent to testify either for or against their respective spouses in civil cases in
the majority of jurisdictions. MCCORMICK § 66.
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